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The role of the Bundestag in shaping the European policy 
 of reunited Germany1
Following the reunification of Germany, the first parliamentary elections attended 
by the citizens of the former German Democratic Republic were held on December 2, 
1990. However, this did not lead to any major shifts in the German political scene and 
power remained in the hands of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition and Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl. Although the circumstances had changed, Germany’s European policy contin-
ued as before and the previous role of the parliament in shaping the state’s foreign 
policy was maintained. Members of the German Bundestag and representatives of 
the Federal Council (Bundesrat) exercise parliamentary control over the government’s 
European policy, and the government should take their demands into account in its 
activities in the European Union. This requirement is set forth in Article 23 of the Ger-
man Constitution, reading as follows: “The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the 
Länder [represented by the Federal Council] shall participate in matters concerning the 
European Union. The Federal Government shall keep the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
informed, comprehensively and at the earliest possible time” (Paragraph 2). “Before 
participating in legislative acts of the European Union, the Federal Government shall 
provide the Bundestag with an opportunity to state its position. The Federal Govern-
ment shall take the position of the Bundestag into account during the negotiations” 
(Paragraph 3) (Ustawa Zasadnicza, 2007, p. 99).2 In addition, the Lisbon Treaty gave 
more power to national parliaments by authorizing them to verify the principle of sub-
sidiarity, to participate in treaty amendment procedures, to build “the area of freedom, 
security and justice” of the EU and to access information and draft legal acts of the EU 
institutions (Article 8c., Traktat z Lizbony, 2009).
In Germany, it has become customary for the Chancellor to present the government’s 
position and German postulates to the Bundestag, usually before the more important 
meetings of the European Council. The Chancellor’s presentation is then discussed by 
the MPs and, after a vote, the Chancellor goes to Brussels with the position thus adopted 
(or modified). In this way, the public is kept informed of the government’s decisions on 
European affairs, as parliamentary sessions are broadcast live by the state television.
The first serious problems with the European policy of reunited Germany could 
already be observed in the Bundestag after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, one of 
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the milestones of European integration. The Treaty establishing the European Union, 
signed on February 7, 1992, required ratification by the European Parliament and the 
member states, either through a parliamentary path or, as in the case of France or Den-
mark, through a referendum. Germany, in the absence of any profound social divisions 
on European issues, opted for a parliamentary solution. Consequently, on December 2, 
1992 the Bundestag adopted the Maastricht Treaty without much discussion and by 
an overwhelming majority of 543 votes in its favor, 17 votes against it, and 8 votes 
abstaining. The Bundesrat gave its acceptance on December 18, 1992, with all the 
Länder voting for the Treaty. Later that month, however, five complaints were quite 
unexpectedly submitted to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, challenging 
the ratification act on the grounds of its alleged incompatibility with the German Basic 
Law. Representatives of these groups, Manfred Brunner, Karl Albrecht Schachtschnei-
der, Hans-Christian Ströbele and Ulrich K. Preuß accused the government and parlia-
ment of agreeing to the transfer of German sovereignty to supranational bodies, which 
purportedly deprived the Bundestag of its power and was contrary to the principles of 
democracy. The transfer of powers to supranational organizations was allegedly a vio-
lation of the Basic Law, since decisions on such vital matters as sovereignty should 
be taken in Germany and not on the European level. Federal President Johannes Rau 
explained to the Federal Constitutional Court that he would only sign the ratification if 
the Court did not uphold the complaints (Bryde, 1993, p. 37).
It was not until October 12, 1993 that the Second Senate of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court issued its long-awaited ruling on the Maastricht Treaty. Out of the five 
complaints referred to in the ruling, four did not pass the admissibility test and were 
dismissed. Only the complaint by Manfred Brunner, former Head of Cabinet of EC 
Commissioner Martin Bangemann, was declared formally admissible, but it was then 
rejected for lack of grounds (Winkelmann, 1994).
The activities of the Bundestag in the 1990s and in the early 21st century had a huge 
impact on the development of German defense policy, and thus had a direct impact on 
the overall shape and effectiveness of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and the Common Security and Defense Policy.
From 1993, Chancellor Kohl’s government tried to push through a parliamenta-
ry law that would make it possible to amend the Basic Law and allow Bundeswehr 
soldiers to participate in international armed forces. However, those efforts came up 
against strong resistance from the opposing SPD, which did not accept the participation 
of German troops in any peace-making operations and only tolerated peace-keeping 
ones, as long as they were based on a specific UN mandate (Diehl, 1994, p. 445).
On July 12, 1994, the ruling of the Second Chamber of the Constitutional Court 
created a constitutional and legal basis for the use of the German armed forces abroad. 
The parties of the ruling CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, constantly under fire from their 
western allies, decided to increase the Bundeswehr’s participation in peace-keeping 
operations in former Yugoslavia. Wolfgang Schäuble, head of the CDU/CSU parlia-
mentary faction, was supposed to say publicly that “now we will certainly use more 
than just a checkbook.” The Court’s ruling finally put an end to speculations about the 
admissibility, competences and limits of Germany’s active foreign and security policy. 
The Federal Republic was formally ‘allowed’ to fulfill the obligation guaranteed in the 
RIE 12 ’18 The role of the Bundestag in shaping the European policy... 115
preamble to the Basic Law towards NATO and the European Union, i.e. “to promote 
world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe.” The parliament’s approval of 
such military operations was treated by the judges as a sine qua non condition for any 
political decision to deploy the Bundeswehr outside the scope of NATO operations 
(Urteil, 1994, p. 5).
The Court’s verdict of July 12, 1994 allowed the Bundeswehr to participate in 
peacekeeping operations not only as part of peace missions of the Blue Helmets but 
also in NATO combat operations, provided that each time a decision in favor of such 
actions was taken by a simple majority of the Bundestag. This definitively put an end 
to the long-standing dispute in Germany over the constitutional and legal basis for the 
use of German armed forces outside Germany. The parties of the ruling CDU/CSU-
FDP coalition, accused of inaction and under fire from their western allies, decided to 
increase the Bundeswehr’s participation in peacekeeping operations in former Yugo-
slavia (Balkan, 1994).
The assertive foreign and European policy of the Schröder/Fischer government 
(1998–2005), characterized by prioritizing German national interests, resulted in Ber-
lin’s refusal to participate in the anti-Iraq operation orchestrated and conducted by the 
United States in April 2003. As a result of the ensuing public debate, on March 18, 
2005 the Bundestag adopted another Law on the Participation of the Parliament in 
Decisions on the Deployment of Armed Forces Abroad. Only those missions in which 
Bundeswehr soldiers would be involved in armed activities would require the Bun-
destag’s consent. This did not apply to humanitarian, rescue and peace-keeping (polic-
ing) missions. The procedure required the Federal Government to send a request to the 
Bundestag for approval for the deployment of the armed forces, in good time before 
the start of the mission. It was specified that such a request should specify the task of 
the mission, its application, legal basis, the number of soldiers required, the possibility 
of using the armed forces, the planned duration of the mission and the estimated costs 
of the expedition of German soldiers (Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung, 
2005).
The Bundestag’s influence on European politics was most evident after the adop-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty. After the end of the Portuguese Presidency, crowned by 
the signing of the Lisbon Treaty on December 13, 2007, the process of the Treaty’s 
ratification by the European Parliament and the member states of the European Union 
began. On April 24, 2008 the Bundestag ratified the Lisbon Treaty in a landslide vote, 
as the coalition parties and most of the opposition voted in favor of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Angelica Schwall-Düren, Vice-Chairwoman of the SPD parliamentary group in the 
Bundestag, and Volker Kauder, head of the CDU/CSU group, were in favor of rapid 
ratification of the Treaty, saying that it “strengthened democracy” in the EU and made 
it more “specific.” 515 MPs supported the ratification of the Treaty. 58 MPs from Die 
Linke (The Left) voted against, and its leader Lothar Bisky criticized the Lisbon Treaty 
as being a virtual copy of the rejected European Constitution. Die Linke was also in 
favor of holding a referendum on the Treaty’s ratification (Bundestag ratifiziert EU-
Reformvertrag, 2008).
The Bundesrat vote took place on May 23, 2008. The Lisbon Treaty was supported 
by 15 of the 16 Länder of Germany, with Klaus Wowereit, the mayor of Berlin (SPD), 
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abstaining in the wake of Berlin SPD’s conflict with its coalition partners (the post-
communist Left), who rejected the Lisbon Treaty, considering it a manifestation of 
“neoliberalism and militarism.” Immediately after the vote, Peter Gauweiler, a Bavari-
an Christian Democrat politician (CSU), and Dieter Dehm, a left-wing MP, challenged 
the new treaty before the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, claiming that the docu-
ment was undemocratic, threatened Germany’s sovereignty and weakened the role of 
national parliaments. Mr. Dehm also spoke about “militarization of the European Un-
ion” following the adoption of CSDP-related provisions in the Treaty (Fahrun 2008; 
Volksabstimmung 2008) (Fahrun, 2008; Volksabstimmung, 2008).
Federal President Horst Köhler approved the content of the Lisbon Treaty, but, as pre-
viously announced, refrained from signing the instrument of ratification until the ruling 
of the Constitutional Court. The case became even more complicated in January 2009, 
when the Court received another complaint against the ratification of the Lisbon Trea-
ty, submitted by Dieter Spethmann, a former management board member of Thyssen 
AG, Franz Ludwig Graf Stauffenberg, a former MEP from the CSU, Joachim Starbatty, 
a business expert, and Markus Kerber, a law professor from Berlin. They claimed that the 
government, by ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, would violate the Constitution, thus posing 
a threat to financial stability. In their opinion, the expectations of the Constitutional Court 
regarding European integration expressed in the 1993 judgment on the Maastricht Treaty 
(which consequently allowed the introduction of the euro) had proven false. The EU was 
in constant breach of the Stability and Growth Pact, the European Commission exceeded 
its mandate and the distribution of rights was not transparent (Wefing, 2009). Much to 
the dissatisfaction of Chancellor Merkel, the whole procedure was delayed because both 
complaints had to be dealt with separately.
On June 30, 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe ruled that the Lis-
bon Treaty was in keeping with the German Constitution. At the same time, it added 
that the role of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in the European Union had to be 
strengthened. Referring to its earlier ruling of October 12, 1993 on the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Court stated that the European Union, while possessing a legal personality, 
remains a “union of states” (Staatenverbund), but is in no way a federation. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, the term “interlinked states” means “a close and lasting bond 
between sovereign states” (enge auf Dauer angelegte Verbindung souverän bleibende 
Staaten), which exercises public power on the basis of the treaties and whose system 
is determined solely by the EU member states. “The peoples” living in the member 
states remain the stakeholders in the process of democratic legitimization of the Eu-
ropean Union. In the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, the European Union 
is no longer an ‘ordinary’ “union of states” (Staatenverband), but it not yet a “federal 
state” (Bundesstaat). The EU does not have its own “state sovereignty” (souveräne 
Eigenstaatlichkeit), which only member states have. The Court pointed out that the 
European Union has only the authority allowed by its member states, by virtue of the 
treaties approved by national parliaments. The sovereignty of the member states is 
safeguarded, inter alia, by the principle of conferred powers. As aptly noted by Janusz 
J. Węc, a political scientist from Cracow, “member states continue to be ‘the rulers of 
treaties’ and the European Union has not acquired the competency to establish its own 
competencies” (Węc, 2011, p. 119).
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The Federal Constitutional Court stated that the European Union was a union of 
sovereign states, rather than a federation. If Germany wanted to become a part of a Eu-
ropean federation, then – according to Article 146 of the German Constitution – the 
nation would have to decide on this in a referendum, after a new German constitution 
was created to allow it.
In a reassuring tone, the Constitutional Court explained that, although the Lisbon 
Treaty marks the beginning of a new phase of European integration, the Federal Re-
public would not lose its sovereignty after its entry into force and would continue to 
be an entity recognized by international law. The existing state system was guarded by 
the current Basic Law, which prevented the formation of a federation that the German 
people could join. If such a concept of a European federation were to emerge in the 
future, the German nation (sovereign) – as mentioned above – would have to express 
its will, and the German Constitution would have to be changed (ibid.).
In accordance with the Court’s ruling, the Bundestag would, among other things, 
give its consent to the transfer of competencies to the EU in areas such as criminal law, 
defense policy, environmental protection, cross-border aspects of family law, labor 
law and social matters, as well as to the application of the so-called flexibility clause, 
which gives the EU the right to take action in areas not provided for in the Treaty (Ge-
setz über die Wahrnehmung, 2009).
The judges expressed concerns that the ongoing process of giving additional com-
petencies to EU bodies would reduce German sovereignty. Thus, as already mentioned, 
they indirectly stated that the creation of a federation of EU member states would be 
contrary to the German Basic Law. These issues were to be set forth in an amendment to 
the new Competencies Act at the end of August 2009, even before Bundestag elections. 
Until then, President Köhler was unable to sign the ratification act (Jungholt, 2009).
Not without some delay, on September 8, 2009, the Bundestag passed the Com-
petencies Act. The new law, supported by all parties except the post-communist Left, 
strengthened the influence of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in matters relating to 
the European Union.
The other member states were notified that Germany was bound by a judgment of the 
Constitutional Court on the new EU treaty. The measure also met the expectations of the 
Bavarian CSU, which demanded that the Bundestag adopt an additional resolution stating 
that the Lisbon Treaty would be applied in Germany in accordance with the Court’s inter-
pretation. However, the other parties did not support this proposal. The competencies laws 
accompanying the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty consisted of the following five Acts:
Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundes- –
rat in Matters Concerning the European Union (Gesetz über die Ausweitung und 
Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union);
new Act on the Responsibility for Integration ( – Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung der 
Integrationsverantwortung des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegen-
heiten der Europäischen Union);
Act Amending the Basic Law on the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty ( – Gesetz zur 
Umsetzung der Grundgesetzänderungen für die Ratifizierung des Vertrags von 
Lissabon);
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Act Amending the Act on Cooperation between the Federal Government and the  –
Bundestag in EU matters (Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung 
und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union);
Act Amending the Act on Cooperation between the Federation and the  – Länder on 
European Union Matters (Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern 
in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union).3
Although 446 MPs voted in favor of the laws and only 46 MPs, mainly from the 
Die Linke party, were against it, it was not all as harmonious as it might appear at 
first glance. CSU leader Horst Seehofer unexpectedly submitted a list of 14 demands 
and objections. Among other things, he demanded national referendums on “important 
European issues” that would be binding on the government. He also demanded the 
monitoring of European law by the German Constitutional Court. After the adoption of 
the laws by the Bundestag, the Bundesrat approved them on September 18, following 
which they were finally signed by President Horst Köhler (bart, 2009).
The adopted laws significantly strengthened the influence of the German Parlia-
ment over the European policy of the government. For instance, the Bundestag was 
to be notified quickly and comprehensively by the Cabinet of the EU’s decisions. The 
notification should include information on the position of the Federal Government, 
preparations for and conduct of discussions in the EU’s institutions, comments by the 
European Parliament, the European Commission and other EU member states and 
the decisions taken. This was also to apply to all preparatory committees and work-
ing groups. The obligation to provide information also applies to the preparation and 
proceedings of informal meetings of ministers of the euro summit, the Eurogroup and 
similar institutions (Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit, 2013). The parliament’s con-
sent was necessary in the event of transferring federal competencies in certain areas 
to the EU institutions. The newly adopted laws did not only confer veto rights to the 
Bundestag, but the German government also undertook to keep the parliament fully in-
formed about the plans and intentions of its European policy. In addition, the Bundestag 
had to authorize the opening of negotiations with new membership candidates and the 
negotiation of new treaties. The Bundestag gained the power to order the government 
to bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union if it transpired that 
the Union was interfering with Germany’s internal affairs. The law on responsibility 
for integration provided for two types of cooperation right; first, it specified the right of 
participation, which the Federal Constitutional Court formulated pursuant to the Basic 
Law according to the principle of ‘responsibility for integration.’ In addition, the law 
changed the rights of national parliaments resulting from the Lisbon Treaty, which had 
a direct impact at the European level. Regulations such as, for example, the right to 
3 Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates 
in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union vom 22.09.2009, https://www.buzer.de/gesetz/9032/ 
index.htm; Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung; Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Grundgesetzänderungen 
für die Ratifizierung des Vertrags von Lissabon vom 1.Dezember 2009, dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/ 
btd/16/139/1613924.pdf; Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem 
Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, Bundestministerium der Juztiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz, 4.07.2013, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/euzbbg_2013/BJNR217000013. 
html; Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen 
Union vom 23.03 1993, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/euzblg/BJNR031300993.html.
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complain about compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, were already included in 
the old law and were carried over from it. Another important issue were the so-called 
‘bridging clauses,’ which make it possible to change the voting method in the Council 
of the European Union (qualified majority). Importantly, although the change makes 
it easier to reach a final solution, it also weakens the positions of individual member 
states, which may be outvoted. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty introduced safeguards for 
the parliaments of the member states: if the European Council decides to take an initia-
tive, the parliaments of the member states are informed thereof. They may veto this ini-
tiative (without the government’s involvement) directly at the European level within six 
months. If there is no such veto, the European Parliament must give its consent. The final 
decision must then be taken by the Council of the EU. A voice from the Bundestag could 
once again be heard at this stage: the German representative in the Council can only vote 
in favor of this proposal after the entry into force of the relevant federal law. According to 
the intention of the Federal Constitutional Court, this could be seen as a so-called double 
guarantee (Der Lissabon-Vertrag stärkt die Parlamente, 2013).
The German Parliament played an important role during the financial crisis in the 
euro zone, when it joined the efforts to support Greece, which found itself at the brink 
of financial collapse. On April 23, 2010, the government in Athens officially asked 
the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assist-
ance. On May 2, the Finance Ministers of the eurozone agreed on a rescue package for 
Greece, worth EUR 110bn over the next three years, subject to severe budget cuts. The 
IMF’s share in the relief effort was in the area of EUR 30bn.
On April 27, the German Finance Ministry submitted a special draft law to the 
parliament. On May 7, 2010, Chancellor Merkel presented a draft aid plan for Greece 
to Members of the Bundestag and announced that Germany’s participation would be 
EUR 22.4bn, in the form of loans and loan guarantees. In her opinion, the Greek gov-
ernment’s promise to implement radical austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit 
would allow the aid plan to be implemented. The Chancellor patiently explained that 
no important decision could be taken in the European Union without Germany or 
against Germany. She said that financial assistance could not have been provided to 
Greece earlier because it could have been counterproductive. The implementation of 
the rescue package for Greece was only possible when Greece explained how it in-
tended to reduce its excessive budget deficit and internal debt. The act authorizing the 
government to participate in the rescue plan was passed by the Bundestag after the first 
reading (Gesetz zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen, 2010).
On May 19, another draft on the government’s financial guarantees under the Eu-
ropean Financial Mechanism was fast-tracked to the Bundestag. On May 22, it was 
approved by the Bundesrat and signed by President Horst Köhler, as one of the last 
documents signed by him in that capacity. The law stipulated that emergency measures 
requested by a eurozone member could be “used to maintain solvency if absolutely 
necessary in order to safeguard the stability of the eurozone as a whole.” The grant-
ing of these “emergency measures” was to be subject to “strict conditions” set by 
the IMF, the ECB, the European Commission and the country concerned (Gesetz zur 
Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines europäischen Stabilisierungs-
mechanismus, 2010).
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After receiving the consent of the German Parliament, a coordinated action by 
the eurozone countries and the IMF was launched, eventually resulting in disbursing 
further tranches of financial assistance to Greece from the huge financial package of 
EUR 110bn. The money was primarily intended to support Greece’s domestic banks, 
stabilize the budget and halt the economic downturn. However, it soon became clear 
that the catastrophic collapse of the Greek economy and social resistance to drastic 
austerity reforms would require another aid package for the country. The European 
Commission considered it necessary to prepare a second aid package for Greece with 
the active involvement of the European Central Bank. The aid was to be conditional 
on the continuation of austerity measures by the Greek government. In addition, the 
reforms had to be agreed upon with major political parties in Greece, including, first 
and foremost, the conservative opposition and the socialists (Griechenland-Hilfe, 
2011).
During a fierce debate in the Bundestag on September 7, 2011, Chancellor Merkel 
made a dramatic appeal for more financial support (“if the euro fails, Europe fails”) for 
countries at risk. She announced internal austerity and attacked the former SPD/Green 
government, which was unable to reform public finances and, despite the critical opin-
ions of many experts, agreed that Greece should join the eurozone. In response, the 
Social Democrats accused her of conducting a chaotic foreign policy and delaying the 
green light to help Greece because she did not want to upset voters before important 
parliamentary elections in the Länder (Generaldebatte im Bundestag, 2011).
Before the vote in the Bundestag at the end of September 2011, which was so 
important for Merkel’s cabinet, Germany stepped up pressure on Greece to resolutely 
continue repairing the state’s finances, as this would determine the flow of money to 
its economy from aid funds. Despite an open rebellion, even within the CDU and CSU, 
the Chancellor knew well that coalition loyalty would stay strong, as the alternative 
would mean the collapse of her government and early elections. She was also aware 
that in this matter she could count on the pro-European opposition (SPD), who sup-
ported the plans to save Greece from financial collapse. Under such circumstances, 
the results of the Bundestag vote on September 29, 2011 were a foregone conclusion. 
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was supported by an overwhelming 
majority. A total of 523 members of the Bundestag voted in its favor, 85 were against, 
and three abstained (Entwurf eines Gesetzes, 2011; Bannas, 2011).
Another decision of the Bundestag connected with various ideas on how to solve 
the eurozone crisis concerned the creation of special financial instruments that could 
be used to support countries at risk or to prevent a crisis situation from happening 
again. By a decision of the European Council of March 25, 2011, the two temporary 
European stability mechanisms (EFSF and EFSM) were replaced in the second half 
of 2012 with a permanent financial assistance mechanism for eurozone countries – the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The role of this permanent mechanism, manag-
ing a huge budget of EUR 700bn, was to disburse funding and provide assistance to 
eurozone countries at risk, based on strict conditions. The ESM provided a permanent 
crisis resolution framework to safeguard the overall financial stability of the euro-
zone. The ESM took over the responsibilities of the temporary mechanisms (EFSF and 
EFSM) and complemented the EU’s new enhanced economic surveillance framework. 
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The ESM was established by agreement between the eurozone member states as an 
intergovernmental organization under public international law based in Luxembourg. 
It required ratification by all eurozone countries. In the case of Germany, the granting 
of loans and German participation in the ESM required the statutory approval of the 
Bundestag.
The ratification of the fiscal pact and the ESM by Germany on June 29, 2012 in 
the Bundestag was not the last step in the legislative process, as it did not take effect 
due to a complaint submitted to the Constitutional Court. The complaining party asked 
the Court to examine the compatibility of the euro rescue packages with the German 
Basic Law. At the Court’s request, President Joachim Gauck did not sign the law. Karl 
Albrecht Schachtschneider, a law professor and constitutionalist from Nuremberg, 
Joachim Starbatty, an economist from Tübingen, Wilhelm Nölling, a former Senator 
from Hamburg, Wilhelm Hankel, an 82-year-old economist, and Dieter Spethmann, 
the former CEO of Thyssen, believed that the government’s decision to participate in 
the ESM would increase Germany’s already record debt and trigger inflation. Chris-
toph Degenhart, a state law specialist from Nuremberg, and Herta Däubler-Gmelin 
(SPD), a former German Minister of Justice, questioned both rescue packages for 
Greece, claiming that the EU’s anti-crisis ESM and the so-called fiscal pact, adopted 
on the initiative of Germany, violated democratic principles, both at the European level 
and within Germany itself. Degenhardt and Däubler-Gmelin, together with a total of 
37,000 citizens, supported the claims submitted to the Constitutional Court. 25,000 
citizens directly joined the constitutional complaint of More Democracy, an associa-
tion founded by Degenhardt and Däubler-Gmelin. In addition, complaints against the 
European Stability Mechanism were submitted by the parliamentary club of the Die 
Linke Party and, as one might expect, the Bavarian CSU politician Peter Gauweiler 
(Niemcy: czekanie na wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 2012).
Critics argued that the ESM Agreement did not have a termination and limitation 
of liability clause. Theoretically, the Council of Finance Ministers of the eurozone 
can increase the total subscribed capital of the ESM as and when needed, and thus 
increase the guarantees provided by the states. This would violate the sovereign budg-
etary powers of the German Parliament and the provisions of the EU Treaty. According 
to the Treaty, member states are not liable for the obligations of other states (so-called 
no bail-out clause).
In the judgment of September 12, 2012, the Federal Constitutional Court did not 
find the law ratifying the international agreement on the permanent euro stability 
mechanism (ESM) to be in any way incompatible with the German Basic Law. How-
ever, certain conditions were prescribed by the Court. The judges indicated in their 
ruling that the amount guaranteed by Germany must not exceed EUR 190bn, and, if 
this were to be exceeded, the consent of the Bundestag was necessary (Beschwerde 
zurückgewiesen, 2012; Euro-Urteil, 2012).
The decision of the Court of Justice was welcomed with relief by the German gov-
ernment. Chancellor Merkel spoke of “a good day for Germany and Europe.” As a re-
sult, on September 28, the Bundestag passed a law on Germany’s participation in the 
ESM with a total financial contribution of EUR 189,994bn, of which nearly 170 billion 
were loan guarantees (Gesetz zur finanziellen Beteiligung, 2012).
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Since it was financial institutions that sparked the crisis situation in the eurozone, 
a solution to prevent such crises from reoccurring was the Banking Union. According 
to a report by Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council, adopted at the 
European Council meeting in December 2012, steps were taken to make the Banking 
Union a reality. It was to be based on three pillars: a single supervisory mechanism, 
a single resolution mechanism, and interconnected financing mechanisms (common to 
the whole internal market), i.e. a single resolution fund, deposit guarantee scheme, and 
common system for deposit protection (credit line) (Węc, 2014, pp. 33–34).
On November 6, 2014, the proposal was discussed in the Bundestag, as the govern-
ment submitted four bills intended to enable and support the Banking Union. In recom-
mending them to Bundestag members, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble hailed the 
Banking Union as “the biggest integration project since the introduction of the euro 
and an important element of financial governance in Europe.” Despite the protests on 
the left, the four laws were adopted by an overwhelming majority (Deutscher Bun-
destag beschließt vier Gesetze, 2014).
Out of the 23 Committees in the 18th Bundestag (2013), the European Union Af-
fairs Committee (Der Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union), 
set forth in the German Basic Law, played a key role in Germany’s European policy 
issues. The European Union Affairs Committee is one of the four committees (the 
other three being the Defense Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Peti-
tions Committee) explicitly mentioned in the Basic Law (Art. 45) and must be set up 
in each legislative period. The Committee, in the capacity of an Integration and Inter-
sectionality Board, participates in the most important decisions, without prejudice to 
the competencies of the other committees in charge of specific topics. In principle, all 
committees of the German Bundestag are responsible for advising on European mat-
ters within their respective areas of competence. However, as an integration and inter-
sectionality board, the EU Affairs Committee is a central part of Germany’s decision-
making process on European issues. In this capacity, it is responsible for fundamental 
issues of European integration, institutional reforms, EU enlargement and cooperation 
with the European Parliament and the national parliaments of the other member states. 
As a horizontal committee, it deals in particular with European projects covering sev-
eral different policy areas. It participates in the process of setting up EU agencies and 
multi-annual programs such as Europe 2020 or the 2009 Stockholm Program (Auss-
chuss für die Angelegenheiten, 2013).
Until the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, parliamentarians 
from the European Community were elected by national parliaments. In Germany, Mem-
bers of the European Parliament were also members of the German Bundestag. After 
1979, these double mandates expired and the Bundestag was no longer well informed 
on EC matters. In response, the committee of the so-called Elders’ Councils proposed 
some improvements. In 1983, the 10th Bundestag set up a European Committee, fea-
turing 11 parliamentarians and 11 MEPs. Nevertheless, still too few people were for-
mally involved in these structures. In 1991, the 12th Bundestag established the European 
Community Affairs Committee, which focused on the creation of the European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty) and, in particular, on the economic and monetary union (Abels, 2015 
p. 117). 33 members of the Bundestag and 11 MEPs joined the Committee. However, 
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being a horizontal committee, it was not entitled to submit decision proposals, as this 
remained the domain of the relevant specialist committees. It was not until 1994, at the 
time of the 13th Bundestag, that today’s EU Committee was established and given spe-
cial powers (Bundestag und Europa Europäische Union, 2007, pp. 4–5).
The Federal Government is legally obliged to comprehensively and promptly in-
form the Bundestag about all projects that may be of interest to the Federal Republic 
of Germany within the European Union. This is done through written and oral reports 
from meetings of the European Council and the Council of the European Union in its 
various configurations. In addition, briefings are held on current initiatives and events 
at the European level, in which the position of the Federal Government is explained 
(Aufgaben und Arbeit).
The Committee regularly invites European institutions (members of the European 
Commission, representatives of other member states, Members of the European Par-
liament, directors of EU agencies and experts) in order to stay up to date with current 
developments in the EU. The EU Affairs Committee is also responsible for liaising 
with the European Parliament and the parliaments of the other EU member states and 
candidate countries, and participates in meetings of the Conference of Community and 
European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC).
As a rule, the Committee does not deal with the implementation of directives al-
ready adopted at the EU level, as this is the responsibility of the relevant special-
ist committees. The EU Affairs Committee, like the other committees of the German 
Bundestag, is responsible for preparing decisions taken at plenary sessions. Under cer-
tain conditions, the Committee can implement the laws of the German Bundestag and 
make statements to the Federal Government (so-called Plenary Resolutions). In this 
way, it can, if necessary, clarify on a case-by-case basis the parliament’s position on 
legislative proposals of the European Union. Unlike other committees, the EU Affairs 
Committee can propose amendments to the recommendations of other committees.
The 34 members of the Committee established by the 18th Bundestag included 
17 CDU/CSU members, 11 SPD members and 3 members from Die Linke and from 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. In addition, the EU Affairs Committee features 15 German 
MEPs, who are non-voting members of the Committee. By participating in the Com-
mittee, the MEPs ensure cooperation at the national and European level. The Com-
mittee was chaired by Gunther Krichbaum, a member of the CDU and a lawyer, who 
had held this office since 2007, and entered the Bundestag in the 2017 elections with 
a direct mandate.
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Summary
Pursuant to the German constitution, the Bundestag exercises parliamentary control over 
the government’s European policy. In its activities in the European Union the government must 
take account of the Bundestag’s proposals. The 2009 Competencies Laws strengthened the par-
liament’s position in European government policy, making any major decision on EU matters 
practically dependent on the consent of the Bundestag. According to the author, although this 
severely restricted Chancellor Merkel’s freedom of action, it did not paralyze the government’s 
European initiatives. The German Parliament behaved responsibly, especially during the fi-
nancial crisis in the eurozone, allowing financial support for Greece, the establishment of the 
European Stability Mechanism and the establishment of the Banking Union.
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Rola Bundestagu w kształtowaniu polityki europejskiej zjednoczonych Niemiec 
 
Streszczenie
Zgodnie z Ustawą zasadniczą Niemiec, to Bundestag sprawuje parlamentarną kontrolę nad 
europejską polityką Niemiec. Każdorazowo rząd musi informować o swoich zamierzeniach 
posłów. Ustawy kompetencyjne z 2009 r. wzmocniły dodatkowo parlamentarną kontrolę, uza-
leżniając podjęcie każdej kluczowej dla losów Niemiec decyzji w Unii Europejskiej od zgody 
deputowanych. W opinii autora ogranicza to możliwości do działania rządu Merkel w UE, ale 
też nie paraliżuje jego inicjatyw. Bundestag zachowywał się odpowiedzialnie i zgodnie z wolą 
rządu w okresie kryzysu finansowego strefy euro, gdzie wymagana była zgoda na finansową 
pomoc dla Grecji, ustanowienie Europejskiego Mechanizmu Stabilności i unię bankową.
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